We had no deterrence

And we had vulnerability at the strategic level. And I want Rosetta Stone Language to assert that. That's extremely important, I think, to understand where we are. Strategic vulnerability.I mean, that the enemy is capable of producing weapons that will be of strategic destructive force for the United States of America. Not plutonium core weapons but highly enriched uranium, gun-type devices, of the kind we dropped on Hiroshima, not the kind we dropped on Nagasaki, a weapon that does not need to be tested, a weapon that it is very plausible Al Qaeda could fabricate. Or, the virus that moves from person to person and is both easily transmitted and quite deadly: One of the reasons we are concerned about smallpox. This vulnerability at the strategic level, against which we have no defense and no deterrence led the administration to look to pre-emption and preventive war but not just against terrorists because terrorists were linked with rogues.And so, we've come full circle, and now our policy to North Korea, and, I think, in other rogue states who threaten us with weapons of mass destruction threaten us not only because they, themselves, might not be deterrable, but because they may transfer this capability to those which can't be deterred nor defended against.Hence, we have the State of the Union message linking rogues and terrorists. We also have the nuclear policy review, the leak of which describes five countries which we may target with nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive or preventive Language Learning Software mode, adding to the axis of evil Syria and Libya. We have the speech at West Point just recently in which President Bush is quite clear about the imprudence of waiting too long before we deal with a threat coming from a rogue state and a rogue state that might transfer that capability to terrorists and, then, of course, if we were unconvinced by this, we have the absolute authority. The Washington Post on Monday in a headline: Bush Developing Military Policy Of Striking First.So, in phase three of the administration's policy to North Korea, our nonproliferation policy has gone to counterproliferation policy, and it is now the counterterrorist policy, and it is squarely in the crosshairs of our counterterrorist policy. If you're looking at North Korea and beginning a discussion with North Koreans, I think that is one kind of inducement for the North Korean cooperation, not what the Clinton administration had in mind, but an inducement, nevertheless. So, what does this mean? And where does this leave us in our policy to deal with North Korea? First, what is the continuing threat? What are we worried about with North Korea? I think the threat continues to be ballistic missiles. Exports to the Middle East. We publicize Iran and Pakistan. That's not all. That's a major concern, continues be. Tests by the North Koreans, if their moratorium should lapse, they allow it to lapse. I would say that this is not a terrific atmosphere for a North Korean test of a ballistic missile over Japan, given the debate in Japanese Learning Software Japan these days. I think that the nuclear weapons concern continues. The nuclear weapons concern was drawn sharply by Undersecretary Bolton along with a concern about biological weapons. He said, and I quote, North Korea has a dedicated national level effort to acquire a biological weapons capability. He goes on to say that he has named North Korea and Iraq for covert nuclear weapons programs in violation of the NPT. The Undersecretary of State identifies North Korea as having a covert nuclear weapons program. We put the conventional threat aside.